While secondary insolvency proceedings may be opened in States where the debtor has an 'establishment' 10 the effect of these proceedings is however limited to assets within the particular State. According to Article 4, the law of the State where insolvency proceedings are opened, governs the conduct and effect of the proceedings and the article 4 sets out a number of matters that are specifically subject to the law governing the opening of the proceedings. These matters include the assets which form part of the estate; the powers of the liquidator; rules governing the lodging, verification and admission of claims; and the priority ranking of creditors. Articles 5-15 however, set out a whole host of exceptions to the Article 4 general rule.
Looking at the European Insolvency Regulation from the perspective of international insolvency principle, its general approach appears to be 'universalism', albeit tempered or modified by pragmatic considerations. The universalist philosophy suggests that there should be a single insolvency proceeding in respect of a debtor which covers all the debtor's assets wherever situated and that applies in respect of all the debtor's legal relationships.
11
Article 4 of the Regulation reflects a universalist approach but the exceptions contained in Articles 5-15 cast a different light. Another modification to the universalist philosophy in the Regulation comes from the fact that secondary insolvency proceedings may be opened in respect of a debtor and these
9
Articles 16 and 25. proceedings do not serve simply as mechanisms for the more convenient collection of assets and their remission to the liquidator in the principal proceedings. The secondary proceedings are subject to the law of the State that opens the secondary proceedings which will apply, inter alia, to the distribution of the assets subject to the secondary proceedings.
12
The role of secondary proceedings in the context of Regulation acknowledges implicitly the alternative to 'universalism'; namely 'territorialism' which suggests that separate insolvency proceedings may be opened in any State where a debtor has assets and that 'local' assets should be in principle be set aside for the benefit of 'local' creditors.
13
Apart however, from a rather bald statement that the proper functioning of the internal market requires a cross-border insolvency initiative there is nothing much in the preamble about higher level objectives. The Commission has painted the background to the proposed amendments with a far broader and bolder brush. The amendments are stated to be with a view to ensuring a smooth functioning of the internal market; its resilience in economic crises and the survival of businesses. Reference is made to the Europe 2020 strategy and the EU's current political priorities to promote economic recovery and sustainable growth, a higher investment rate and the preservation of employment.
14 Language in the proposed new preamble refers to the extension of the regulation to proceedings which "promote the rescue of an economically viable debtor in order to help sound companies to survive and give a second chance to entrepreneurs. 
For a defence of provisions ring-fencing assets for the benefit of 'local' creditors see the paper by the Singapore Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, "Cross-Border Insolvency issues affecting Singapore" (2011) 23 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 413, 419.
Chapter 11 … deserves a prominent place. Based on the idea that a failing business can be reshaped into a successful operation, Chapter 11 was perhaps a predictable creation from a people whose majority religion embraces the idea of life from death." Restructuring mechanisms, including Chapter 11, are designed to keep a business alive so as to preserve this additional going concern value. There is however, another view that if a company encounters economic difficulties the most effective solution may be to shut it down.
20
For instance, if a company is producing goods and services for which there is no ready market then there may be no point in leaving it in existence. There seems little merit in saving a dog food company if the company is producing food that the animals do not like.
21
Putting ailing companies on a life support machine may in fact harm the sector of the economy in which they operate. It makes competitors suffer by forcing them to compete in crowded markets with rivals that are restructured and have their debts reduced but which are ultimately inefficient. There is a move therefore, to a new 'Chapter 11' with a greater emphasis on sales of the debtor's business as a going concern rather than on restructurings in the traditional sense.
22
There is a bit of a gap however, between the rhetoric of the European Commission and the reality. Despite the rhetoric, the Commission proposals are essentially modest and procedural at 20 See C Adams, "An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations" (1991) 20 Hofstra Law Review 117, 133 "[M] ost assets are probably not firm-specific, and so, most insolvent corporations will not have substantially greater going concern than liquidation values and, consequently, will not be good candidates for an effective reorganization." (Art 1). Article 2 goes on to state that for the purposes of the Regulation 'insolvency proceedings' shall mean the collective proceedings referred to in Art 1(1), which proceedings are listed in July 2013 -http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-655_en.htm.
24
Bank Handlowy w . paras 33-35. See also para 49 of the opinion of Advocate General Kokott. 25 Case C-461/11 -judgment 8 th November 2012. The court however also pointed out that the procedure did not entail the divestment of the debtor and therefore could not be classified as an insolvency procedure within the meaning of Article 1.
26
Para 24.
included in the Annex.
The annex may be over-inclusive in that it covers procedures that, strictly speaking, are not collective insolvency proceedings entailing the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator. It may also be under-inclusive in that certain procedures in some countries may satisfy the Art 1(1) definition but are not listed in the Annex. There is also a time lag in that a State may introduce a new insolvency procedure but some time elapses before it appears in the Annex.
27
Under the proposed new regime the Regulation would apply to apply to 'collective judicial or administrative proceedings, including interim proceedings, which are based on a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt and in which, for the purpose of rescue, adjustment of debt, reorganisation or liquidation, (a) the debtor is totally or partially divested of his assets and a liquidator is appointed, or (b) the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a court.' 28 This proposal would certainly allow a wider range of procedures to be listed in Annex A but there is no intention to alter the decisive effect attributed to inclusion in the list nor the procedure whereby a Member State notifies the Commission of what procedures it wants included in the list. There is however a proposal whereby the Commission would examine whether a particular procedure notified to it satisfies the definition, and should be included in the Annex. 29 The
Commission would make the decision on inclusion rather than the Member States, acting through 27 There is a procedure under Article 45 whereby the Council, acting by qualified majority, may amend the Annex.
28
New Article 1(1).
29
New Article 45. The Lehne 2 report, see fn 1, at p 48 suggests however that it is not for Member States to decide which proceedings fall under Annex A and if the Article 1 conditions are met, then "Member States need to notify". the Council, as under the present regime. This amounts to a transfer of power to the Commission at the expense of Member states and it is questionable whether it will lead to more efficient or accurate outcomes unless there is a corresponding increase in the resources available to the Commission.
As far as the UK is concerned, the main point of contention in respect of the expanded definition of 'insolvency proceedings' in the proposed new Regulation is in relation to schemes of arrangement. Schemes of arrangement under the UK Companies Act have proved a popular restructuring tool for large corporate debt and for large companies
30
, including foreign-registered companies.
31
They serve in effect as a form of 'debtor-in-possession' restructuring. The scheme procedure enables a company to enter into a compromise or arrangement with any class of creditors, or members. In this way, the capital structure of a company in financial difficulties may be rearranged. The arrangement may have various elements, either alone or in combination, such as extending the maturity of loans; partial debt write off or converting debt into other instruments including equity in the company. The statute requires that a majority in number representing 75% in value of the class of creditors or members affected must accept the scheme. The court must also sanction a scheme as being fair to the creditors as a whole. 32 Once the statutory conditions are fulfilled, the scheme becomes binding even in respect of those creditors who did not give their consent.
33
The statutory provisions enable unanimous lender consent provisions in loan
30
See generally on schemes G O'Dea, J Long and A Smyth Schemes of Arrangement Law and Practice (Oxford, OUP, 2012 whole. The expanded definition of 'insolvency proceedings' provides an opportunity to revisit the issue of whether or not schemes should be listed under the Regulation. In accordance with the revised definition, one might argue that schemes of arrangement are based on a law relating to the adjustment of debts in which, for the purpose of adjustment of debt, the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a court. They are also judicial proceedings. While they are not invariably 'collective' proceedings, it is not clear what is meant by collective proceedings for the purpose of the Regulation and it should be possible to limit the application of the Regulation to certain types of schemes.
It is unlikely however, that listing of schemes under the Regulation would be welcomed by UK restructuring professionals. On the one hand, there would be automatic EU wide recognition of schemes instead of the present piecemeal recognition but it would limit the jurisdiction of the English courts to sanction schemes to cases where a company had its centre of main interests in the UK. No longer could the courts apply a more flexible 'sufficient connection' test. This would surely detract from the attractiveness of the UK as the restructuring venue of choice for large companies. It might limit the financial and other opportunities of UK-based professionals.
More seriously it might make large corporate restructuring more difficult to accomplish since not all jurisdictions may have the same advantageous laws as the UK that enable 'hold-outs' among minority creditors to be overcome.
C. Jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings
The Regulation gives jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings to the State where the debtor has its centre of main interests (COMI). In the case of companies, there is a presumption that COMI is the same as the place of the registered office but this is only a presumption and it may be rebutted. The only other guidance on COMI in the Regulation comes in recital 13 of the preamble which states that the COMI "should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties". There has been considerable criticism of the COMI concept and its place at the heart of the Regulation. 36 Certainly it is fact sensitive and capable of varying judicial interpretations particularly when, for example, the corporate headquarters, principal assets, place of main operations and place of incorporation are all in different countries. whether it amounts to anything more than an additional bureaucratic requirement -in other words, a "box-ticking" exercise.
The new article also gives any "creditor or interested party who has his habitual residence, domicile or registered office in a Member State other than the State of the opening of proceedings" the right to challenge the decision opening main proceedings. The court opening the main proceedings is required to inform known creditors "of the decision in due time in order to enable them to challenge it." This provision opens up the possibility that foreign creditors might have greater rights than local creditors to appeal against decisions opening insolvency proceedings. This state of affairs appears to be anomalous.
Insolvency-related actions
The Commission proposals also suggest measures of clarification in respect of insolvency-related actions acknowledging that the "delimitation between the Brussels I Regulation and the is a 'directly and closely linked action'. Such guidance need not be exhaustive nor prejudice the generality of the term but it might follow the example of Article 4(2) which sets out conflict of law rules for determining the matters that are subject to the law of the State that opens the insolvency proceedings.
The Commission has also proposed that a liquidator should be allowed to bring insolvency related actions in the defendant's country of domicile as well as in the insolvency forum.
47 This would allow a liquidator to couple an insolvency-related action with, for example, an action based on the duties of directors under company law. 48 There is much merit in this proposal for, at the moment, a liquidator is faced with the prospect and the costs of potentially having to bring proceedings against the same defendant in two different countries. Proceedings under insolvency law to set aside pre-insolvency transactions, on the basis that they are detrimental to the general body of creditors, are insolvency-related. 49 Therefore they should be brought in the State where the insolvency proceedings are opened whereas actions to recover company assets in a
46
On whether the Insolvency Regulation applies where the defendant in an insolvency-related action is resident outside the EU see the preliminary reference to the European court in Schmidt v Hertel-Case C-328/12 The Advocate General suggests that it does but the Virgos-Schmit report, see fn 6, at paras 11 and 44 suggests otherwise. 
48
The proposal adds that insolvency related actions may only be brought in a court of the defendant's domicile if that court has jurisdiction under the Brussels 1 Regulation. But it could be argued that that court has no jurisdiction by virtue of the bankruptcy and analogous proceedings exception under the Brussels 1 Regulation, in which case the proposal means little in practice. The Hess/Oberhammer/Pfeiffer external evaluation of the Regulation is much clearer on this point. It states that the liquidator should be entitled to file the insolvency-related action optionally before the courts of the EU state in which the defendant is domiciled, if and to the extent that, the latter courts have jurisdiction over the connected claim under the Brussels 1 Regulation. -JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4 -at pp 22 and 219-220. 
D. Improving the coordination of main and secondary proceedings
The Insolvency Regulation departs from Universalist ideals by permitting the opening of secondary insolvency proceedings applying to assets in a State where the debtor has an "establishment". Local law applies to these secondary proceedings including local priority rules in respect of the distribution of assets. 51 Under a truly universal regime the primary job of a liquidator in secondary proceedings would be merely to collect assets and hand them over to the liquidator in the main proceeding who would then distribute them in accordance with the law governing the main proceedings. The opening of secondary proceedings protects the position of local preferential creditors whose claims would be regarded as non-preferential under the law of the main proceedings.
The Regulation contains a number of provisions to regulate the relationship between main and secondary proceedings. Firstly, any 'surplus' that remains after payment of all claims that have been lodged in the secondary proceedings must be passed to the Insolvency Practitioner (IP) in the main proceedings but, in practice, there may be nothing left after claims of local preferential creditors have been met. Secondly, there is a duty imposed on the IPs in the main and secondary proceedings to communicate promptly with one another.
52
Thirdly, secondary proceedings can be stayed for up to 3 months at the request of the IP in the main proceedings, although the court in the secondary proceedings granting the stay may require the IP in the main insolvency 
57
One of the drafters of the Regulation has explained that limiting secondary proceedings to liquidations was part of the overall compromise which led to the instrument gaining general acceptance. "By opening a local liquidation proceeding, Member States can pull an emergency brake if they feel that unlimited recognition of foreign rehabilitation proceedings is unfair to their (or to their local creditors') interests." 58 Nevertheless, the limitation may make an overall business sale or restructuring more difficult to accomplish. New Articles 18(1) and 29a(2).
61
See explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission proposal at para 3.1.3.
62
New Article 29(1).
63
New Article 31a.
64
Explanatory memorandum at para 3. 
E. Groups of Companies
The Insolvency Regulation does not have any provisions on groups of companies, whether of a substantive or procedural kind.
68
In determining whether insolvency proceedings may be opened, 
67
According to the explanatory memorandum at para 3.1.3 this "ensures that the opening of secondary proceedings does not automatically thwart the rescue or restructuring of a debtor as a whole." however firmly focuses the inquiry on the individual company holding that "where a company carries on its business in the territory of the Member State where its registered office is situated, the mere fact that its economic choices are or can be controlled by a parent company in another Member State is not enough to rebut the presumption laid down by the Regulation." In other words, the presumption that the COMI is the place of the registered office prevails.
More recently, in the Mediasucre case 71 the European court rejected the proposition that a single COMI could automatically be inferred from the fact that the property of two companies has been intermixed. The court said that such intermixing could be organised from two management and supervision centres in two different Member States.
In dealing with the insolvency of related companies four different approaches are possible. The most interventionist strategy is that of substantive consolidation and to pool the assets of related 
77
Effectively the US venue rules allow for the insolvencies of a large group of associated companies to be administered from the same location.
78
A third, even milder, approach is that of procedural cooperation with the insolvencies of different members of a corporate group administered in different States but with the separate IPs being subject to a duty to cooperate and given a role in the different proceedings. The final approach, and least interventionist strategy, would be simply to disregard the fact that the companies are related and to proceed with separate insolvency proceedings in respect of each company. This approach is likely to be value destructive because the economic affairs of group members may be so entangled that meaningful returns can only be achieved through a coordinated group restructuring and/or sale of assets.
In its proposals the European Commission acknowledges the virtues of the second, procedural consolidation, approach. It states that its proposals are not intended to preclude the "existing practice in relation to highly integrated groups of companies to determine that the centre of main The proposal also gives an IP standing in relation to insolvency proceedings affecting another member of the same group. In particular, the liquidator has a right to be heard in these other proceedings; to request a stay of the other proceedings and to propose a rescue or restructuring plan in accordance with the law applicable to those proceedings. The IP also has the right to attend and participate in a meeting of creditors. 81 The Commission suggests that these procedural tools will enable the IP with the biggest interest in a successful group restructuring to submit a coordinated restructuring plan even if this plan does not meet with the approval of the IPs of
79
See explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission proposals COM (2012) 744 final, para 3.1.5.
80
See new Article 42a and para 3.1.5 of the explanatory memorandum. Not only would the coordinator act as a sort of 'super-mediator' between the different IPs but he also has the task of "presenting a group coordination plan that identifies, describes and recommends a comprehensive set of measures" 86 that are appropriate to an integrated resolution of the group insolvency.
82
Explanatory memorandum, para 3.1.5.
83
New Article 2(j).
84
See H Eidenmuller, fn 3, 149.
85
See Lehne 2 report, fn 1, at pp 39-43 and 47-48.
86
Ibid at p 39.
While it can hardly be doubted that the amicable settlement of disputes between IPs is beneficial, the particular scheme envisaged by Lehne may not offer much of an improvement on the Commission proposals and it may in fact contribute to further costs and delay for at least three reasons. For a start, there is a question about where group coordination proceedings may be commenced. The proposal suggests that is should be in the State "where the most crucial functions within the group are performed". But this may be no easy issue to resolve. Secondly, the group coordination plan has to be approved by the court and individual IPs have the opportunity of commenting upon the plan before it is approved. Thirdly, the group coordination plan is not binding on individual IPs though they have a duty to consider the recommendations in the plan and to explain deviations from the plan at creditors' meetings.
F. Applicable law -Missed opportunities
Under the Regulation the law that applies to insolvency proceedings is, in general, the law of the gives a stronger level of protection against the debtor's insolvency than that demanded by the national law of the situs.
91
There is an EU bonus -a bonus for secured creditors in European cross-border insolvencies that is not available in domestic insolvencies.
92
Unless secondary insolvency proceedings are opened in a particular State, a secured creditor is allowed to enforce against collateral in that State even though the country's domestic law would not allow enforcement.
88
See paras 97-104.
89
For use of this expression see AJ Berends, "The EU Insolvency Regulation: Some Capita Selecta" [2010] Netherlands International Law Review 423, 429 and for discussion of rival approaches see 430-434.
90
The Financial Markets Law Committee Issue paper no 30 (September 2012) European Insolvency Regulation, at p 11 suggests however that there is some uncertainty on the point. See also Article 4(2)(l) on the role of the COMI State in determining who is to bear the costs and expenses incurred in the insolvency proceedings. 
92
See M Virgos and F Garcimartin, The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice (The Hague, Kluwer, 2004) 103-104: "Article 5 functions more as a rule of substantive law than as a simple conflict rule and when, compared with the national laws concerned, it may afford a stronger level of protection against the insolvency of the debtor than that which these national laws demand".
Article 5 however, does not define what is meant by a "right of rem". This is a source of some uncertainty but in general terms it covers security rights i.e. rights over property to ensure the payment of money or the performance of some other obligation.
It is also not clear what is meant by "shall not affect" in Article 5 and whether in particular it prohibits temporary restrictions on the enforcement of security; the writing down of secured debt; and the realization of security by an IP against the wishes of a secured creditor.
The Commission proposals leave Article 5 unchanged but make certain technical adjustments to the old Article 2(g) including new rules on the location of banks accounts.
93 These changes introduce a welcome measure of clarification but certain difficulties remain; not least whether the location rules establish a hierarchy and how to treat tangible property that may be recorded in an ownership register. The position of intellectual property rights is also unclear.
94
The Commission also proposes a new provision -article 6a on netting agreements stating that such agreements shall be governed solely by the law of the contract governing such agreements.
This proposal may suggest that netting agreements are currently outside Article 6 of the Regulation which is worded so as to preserve certain set-off rights. Article 4(2)(d) states that the law of the insolvency forum shall govern the conditions under which set-offs may be invoked, but, under Art 6, set-off rights can still be claimed if they are permitted by the law applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim. The BCCI 95 litigation shows that set-off rights differ significantly
93
Under the Commission proposals, the 'location' rules would be contained in a new Article 2(f) and in the case of cash held in accounts with a credit institution, the asset would be deemed to be located in the State indicated in the account's IBAN. The Commission also missed the opportunity of clearing up another ambiguity in the interpretation of Article 6 and, in fact, in the proposed new Article 6a compounds the area of ambiguity. Article 6, in allowing set-off rights that are permitted by the law applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim does not say whether or not this has to be the law of an EU Member State. One might argue that this limitation is implicit in the Regulation but one could contrast the wording of Article 6, and the proposed new Article 6a, with Article 13. According to Article 4(2)(m), the law of the insolvency forum shall dictate the rules relating to the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all creditors. Article 13 however, provides a defence where the person who benefited from an act detrimental to all the creditors provides proof that (i) the act is subject to the law of a different Member State and (ii) that law does not allow any means of challenging that act in the relevant case. This veto is designed to uphold legitimate expectations based upon the circumstances that exist at the time of acting but the veto is specifically stated to apply only where the relevant law is the law of an EU Member State. In comparing the language of Articles 6 and 13 one could apply the maxim expressio unius, exclusio alterius or alternatively dismiss the difference in wording as simply due to imprecision and inconsistency on the part of the drafter.
Article 10a is another proposed new article from the Commission and it amends Articles 8 and 10 of the Regulation. Article 8 provides that the effects of insolvency proceedings on contracts conferring the right to acquire or make use of immovable property are governed solely by the law of the Member State within whose territory the immovable property is situated. Article 10 states that the effect of insolvency on employment contracts and relations shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract of employment. The preamble to the Regulation states that the purpose of this provision is to protect both employees and jobs. 98 The intention is that the law applicable to the employment contract would determine, for example, whether liquidation operates to terminate or to continue employment contracts. Other important employment law related matters are left to the law of the insolvency forum, including the preferential status of employee claims in liquidation.
The intended new Article 10a states that where the law of a Member State "governing the effects of insolvency proceedings on the contracts referred to in Articles 8 and 10 provides that a contract can only be terminated or modified with the approval of the court opening insolvency proceedings but no insolvency proceedings have been opened in that Member State, the court which opened the insolvency proceedings shall have the competence to approve the termination or modification of these contracts." It seems that behind the Commission proposal is the view that "different labour law standards may hinder an insolvency administrator to take the same See Commission report -COM (2012) 743 -at p 12. The report goes on to say that "this situation is inherent in the policy choice underlying Article 10 which the evaluation study does not call into question. A harmonization of certain aspects of labour law could mitigate this problem but would be difficult to achieve since labour law is deeply rooted in national traditions and, at any rate, go beyond the scope of the revision of the Regulation." in Syska v Vivendi Universal SA. 101 The court suggested that it would border on the irrational to protect the legitimate expectations of those who had commenced an action against the insolvent but not those who had initiated a reference to arbitration.
G. Publicity and improving the position of creditors
The Insolvency Regulation contains some provisions for publicizing the existence of insolvency proceedings but these are essentially voluntary. Article 21 states that a liquidator may request that notice of the opening of insolvency proceedings and the decision appointing him should be published in other Member States in accordance with the publication procedures in those States.
Article 22 states that a liquidator may request that the opening of insolvency proceedings should be registered in the land registers, the trade register and any other public registers kept in other
Member states. The publication of the opening of the insolvency proceedings triggers a presumption that a person honouring an obligation for the benefit of a debtor is aware of the opening of insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor.
102
There may be a considerable time lag between the opening of insolvency proceedings and the proceedings being publicized in another State. court held that while a winding up order by a Belgian court probably ought not to have been made, since the main insolvency proceedings were in the UK, it had to stand as a valid order of the Belgian court unless set aside in Belgium.
The Commission proposes an ambitious new regime to enhance the publicity of proceedings with Member States being required to publish relevant court decisions in insolvency cases in a 'free' and publicly accessible electronic register that is interconnected with the registers of other Member States.
104 The information to be published includes information concerning the court opening the insolvency proceedings, the date of opening and of closing proceedings, the type of proceedings, the debtor, the liquidator appointed, the decision opening proceedings as well as the decision appointing the liquidator, if different, and the deadline for lodging claims.
It is questionable whether the idea of a publicly accessible Community wide electronic register of insolvency proceedings is practically realisable. Moreover, given the considerable costs involved in the establishment and maintenance of such a system it is also questionable whether public funds should be committed to maintaining free access to the system.
Improving the position of creditors
One of the reasons why 'local' creditors may press for the opening of secondary proceedings is that the main proceedings are being transacted in a faraway country and in a language with which they may not be familiar. Foreign creditors may not be familiar with the procedures in the State where main proceedings have been opened including the proofs that have to be submitted and the time limits for lodging claims. The creditor may be required to provide a translation of the claim into one of the official language of the State where the proceedings have been opened. 
Conclusion
The general consensus reflected in the Commission proposals seems to be that the Regulation, on the whole, works well; that fundamental reform is not needed and could in fact be destabilising but that some reform would be beneficial to improve the practical operation of the Regulation.
110
Leading commentators, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, have described the proposals as a
108
Revised Articles 39-41.
109
Revised Article 39.
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It should be noted that the UK has "opted-in" to the proposal -see written ministerial statement of 15 th April 2013 "Government consider that it is in the UK's interest to opt in to the proposal because it will be of general benefit to creditors and businesses in the UK and EU." The statement is available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130415/wmstext/130415m000 1.htm.
probably not do any harm except perhaps in relation to groups of companies where the revised Regulation opens up the possibility of multiple different plans for a group restructuring being put forward by IPs in different countries. Given however, the time and expense in trying to formulate a restructuring plan this nightmarish vista is unlikely to be seen much in practice.
In their proposals for a revised Regulation the Commission has stuck very much within the framework of the existing Regulation. The proposals do not set off on a new path or try to disturb the essential balance of interests at the heart of the political compromises that make up the Insolvency Regulation. that "there are no two priority systems that are identical, and that harmonization or unification of the law in this area is extremely unlikely to happen. In fact, priority systems are but the expression of the hierarchy of values that permeate a given legal system. This means that graduation of creditors is primarily political, and that the influence of powerful groups of creditors, the inertia of legal tradition, or the conscious and deliberate choice to promote certain values, are the factors that explain the fundamental differences encountered in various jurisdictions around the world." restructuring moratorium and whether they can be subjected to a restructuring plan against their wishes are also areas where national differences remain pronounced.
.
There are also differences on the extent to which there should be an investigation of the reasons that caused the company's financial difficulties and whether company management can he held personally responsible for these failings. There are different ideas about whether, and in what circumstances, pre-insolvency transactions may be set aside at the beckoning of an insolvency administrator and the importance ascribed to the security of transactions.
117
Another important area of difference concerns the treatment of employees in insolvency, whether in the context of continuation of employment or pensions.
118
National variation in the priority given to unpaid tax and environmental cleanup claims is also common.
Some countries may place a strong emphasis on liquidation whereas others put a greater emphasis on business restructuring. The last is however, is an area where the Commission have recognized, and tried to forge ahead with, a new consensus. In a Communication on a new European approach to business failure and insolvency they say: "As Europe is facing a severe economic and social crisis, the European Union is taking action to promote economic recovery, boost investment and safeguard employment. It is a high political priority to take measures to create sustainable growth and prosperity." The Commission highlights the importance of insolvency rules in supporting economic activity and, as a first step towards achieving its ambitious goals, it puts forward "the modernisation of the EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings".
120
The rhetoric seems overblown and far divorced from the quite modest changes proposed in the revised Insolvency Regulation. While the modern tendency may be to hype everything and to herald eagerly rafts of new initiatives, this approach sows the seed of dillusionment and disappointed expectations. More prosaically, the Commission missed out on the opportunity for desirable clarifications of the Regulation, for example, in the context of Article 5 and security rights over property. It suggests that the existing provisions "apply sufficiently smoothly within the EU and the respective fields of the lex fori and the lex situ strike the right balance. 
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According to the Commission report at p 18 a possible elaboration of a draft international convention would better achieve these objectives, and also ensure the Union's interests in reciprocal negotiations with the third countries.
